Repeated games with incomplete information pdf

But the research soon became much more generalized, covering information concealment and revelation, signaling and learning, and related ideas in any repeated competitive situation.

The first four chapters of the book treat the competitive zero-sum side of the theory of repeated games. Chapter five takes up cooperative phenomena where one player may want to signal information to another. An extensive bibliography covers all items mentioned in the main text, in the postscripts, and in the introduction. The bibliography also includes a compilation of published papers and books that refer to the original reports. Search Search. Search Advanced Search close Close.

Renault J, Tomala T Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals. Renault J The value of Repeated Games with an informed controller. Renault J, Tomala T Probabilistic reliability and privacy of communication using multicast in general neighbor networks.

Rosenberg D Duality and Markovian strategies. Rosenberg D, Sorin S An operator approach to zero- sum repeated games. Simon RS Separation of joint plan equilibrium payoffs from the min-max functions.

Israel J Math —21 Google Scholar. Sorin S Some results on the existence of Nash equilibria for non- zero sum games with incomplete information. Sorin S Big match with lack of information on one side, Part I. Sorin S On a pair of simultaneous functional equations.

Sorin S Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information. Sorin S A first course on zero-sum repeated games. Springer Google Scholar. Spinat X A necessary and sufficient condition for approachability. Vieille N Weak approachability. Waternaux C Solution for a class of repeated games without recursive structure. Zamir S On the relation between finitely and infinitely repeated games with incomplete information.

Zamir S On repeated games with general information function. Books and Reviews Palaiseau Google Scholar. Mertens J-F Repeated games. In: Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians Miscellaneous IX. Future directions Bibliography. View via Publisher. Save to Library Save. Create Alert Alert. Share This Paper. Background Citations. Methods Citations. Results Citations. Topics from this paper. Emoticon Utility Experiment.

Cobham's thesis Blackwell series Linear algebra. Data structure. Citation Type. Has PDF. Publication Type. More Filters. Mathematics, Computer Science. We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an example of Aumann and Maschler [Aumann, … Expand. View 3 excerpts, cites methods and background.

We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games, by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an example of Aumann and Maschler Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information: the dependent case.

Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer a, b , De Meyer and Marino provided optimal strategies for both players in finitely repeated games with incomplete information on … Expand.

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